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Prospective payment systems are currently used in many OECD countries, where hospitals are paid a 
fixed price for each patient treated. We develop a theoretical model to analyse the properties of the 
optimal fixed prices to be paid to hospitals when no lump-sum transfers are allowed and when the 
price can differ across providers to reflect observable exogenous differences in costs (for example 
land, building and staff costs). We find that: a) when the marginal benefit from treatment is decreasing 
and  the  cost  function  is  the  (commonly  used)  power  function,  the  optimal  price  adjustment  for 
hospitals with higher costs is positive but partial; if the marginal benefit from treatment is constant, 
then  the  price  is  identical  across  providers;  b)  if  the  cost  function  is  exponential,  then  the  price 
adjustment is positive even when the marginal benefit from treatment is constant; c) the optimal price 
is lower when lump-sum transfers are not allowed, compared to when they are allowed; d) higher 
inequality  aversion  of  the  purchaser  is  associated  with  an  increase  in  the  price  for  the  high-cost 
providers and a reduction in the price of the low-cost providers. 
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 1 Introduction
Over the last three decades most OECD countries have made a transition from cost-based
reimbursement of hospitals, via negotiated budgets, to prospective payment systems under
which hospitals are paid on the basis of the volume and type of patients treated (Mossialos,
2002).
Under cost reimbursement hospital payments are paid retrospectively on the basis of
the cost incurred by each individual patient. This reimbursement system operated in the
United States during the 1960s and 1970s. This fuelled escalation in health care costs
as hospitals engaged in a ￿medical arms race￿ , spending ever more on technologies and
facilities to attract patients. Under cost reimbursement, providers were able to claim
the costs back from health insurance companies and Medicare and Medicaid, the public
insurance programmes for the elderly and the poor.
Prospective payment systems aim to overcome the de￿ciencies of cost-based reim-
bursement. Incentives for cost control and e¢ cient behaviour are introduced by relating
payment directly to activity and by ensuring that hospitals cannot in￿ uence the price
they face. There are two key features of prospective payment systems. First, activity
is described using some form of diagnosis related groups (DRGs)1 rather than for each
individual patient (under cost-based reimbursement). Second, the price per DRG is ￿xed
in advance and independent of the costs incurred by the hospital.
Several theoretical studies have analysed the design of optimal payment systems to
induce providers to behave optimally, i.e. to provide the optimal level of quality, cost
containment e⁄ort and the optimal number of treatments (see for example Chalkley and
Malcomson, 1998a and 1998b; Ma, 1994; Rickman and McGuire, 1999; Ellis and McGuire,
1986; Ellis, 1998). A common assumption in this literature is that the payer pays a price
that is not provider speci￿c, combined with a ￿xed lump-sum transfer in order to ensure
providers￿participation in the market.
However, in practice, lump-sum transfers are infrequent.2 Instead, in countries like
1DRGs are standard groupings of clinical treatments, which use similar levels of healthcare resources.
2Moreover, if implemented, lump-sum transfers (or ￿xed-budget component) are positive, while the
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ceives a price for every patient treated. Moreover, prices are adjusted to incorporate
providers￿exogenous di⁄erences in costs. These adjustments are justi￿ed on the basis
that they compensate for costs that hospitals incur because of the environment in which
they are located or the constraints they have on the organisational structure. Such costs
are considered out of the hospital￿ s control.
These constraints bind more tightly in socialised health systems, where hospitals have
highly restricted choice about where they are located, or the population they serve, and ￿at
least in the short term ￿have limited discretion about their size and the mix of specialties
they have. These constraints may impact on the cost of service provision, irrespective of
how ￿e¢ cient￿the hospital is. For example, in England under Payment by Results (PbR),
hospitals are paid an HRG price (the English version of DRG prices) based on national
average costs adjusted by a provider speci￿c index, the Market Factor Forces (MFF). The
MFF adjusts the national price for local unavoidable di⁄erences in factor prices for sta⁄,
land and building costs. The sta⁄ index is built using data on private sector wages and
is calculated to account for wage variation and indirect costs of employing sta⁄. The
buildings index is based on a rolling average of tender prices for all public and private
contracts. The land index is calculated for each hospital in the National Health Service
(NHS) and Primary Care Trust (PCTs), using data from the Valuation O¢ ce on the NHS
estate in 2004. These sub-indices are then combined into a single overall index, known as
the MFF index, which is built by multiplying each providers normalized sub-indices by
the national proportionate usage of these inputs (Department of Health 2002a).
Also in the US, where providers are less restricted in their choices, the DRG payment
system allows for adjustments to the average cost based on providers￿characteristics, for
example to adjust for wage variation, cost variations between urban or rural areas and
teaching status (Shwartz, Merrill and Blake 1984).
To the best of our knowledge only the analysis by Mougeot and Naegelen (2005)
theory predicts negative lump-sum transfers whenever the marginal cost is increasing (as it is commonly
assumed in the literature).
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allowed. More precisely, the authors study whether a ￿xed-price regime complemented
with global expenditure caps can induce ￿rst-best quality and cost-containment e⁄ort
levels when lump-sum transfers are not allowed. While considering that no lump-sum
transfers are allowed, our analysis departs from theirs by focusing on the properties of ￿xed
prices when they can be adjusted to re￿ ect exogenous cost di⁄erences between providers.
If lump-sum transfers are allowed, the optimal incentive scheme is straightforward.
The purchaser can obtain allocative e¢ ciency by setting the price equal to the marginal
bene￿t of provision, so that in equilibrium activity is chosen such that the marginal bene￿t
is equal to the marginal cost. The purchaser does not have to worry about leaving a rent
to the provider as, through the use of lump-sum transfers, the purchaser can extract rents
and leave providers with zero pro￿ts. If providers di⁄er in costs and the marginal bene￿t
is decreasing, then the price for the high-cost provider is higher than for the low-cost
provider: since the optimal activity from the purchaser￿ s perspective is such that marginal
bene￿t is equal to the marginal cost, the optimal activity for the high-cost provider is
lower than for the low-cost provider, while the marginal bene￿t (evaluated at the optimal
activity) and therefore the optimal price is higher.
If lump-sum transfers are not allowed, the purchaser has only one instrument (prices)
to obtain two goals, i.e. allocative e¢ ciency and rent extraction. Since providing a higher
price to the high-cost provider increases its rent, it is not straightforward anymore that
providing a higher price to the high-cost provider is still the optimal solution. The main
result of this study is that in an imperfect setting where purchasers cannot use lump-sum
transfers, under reasonable assumptions, it is still the case that the optimal price for the
high-cost provider is higher than the optimal price for the low-cost provider.
More precisely, we ￿nd that: a) when the marginal bene￿t from treatment is decreasing
and the cost function is the (commonly used) power function, the optimal price adjustment
for hospitals with higher costs is positive but it is partial, i.e. the price adjustment
is smaller than the additional marginal cost; if the marginal bene￿t from treatment is
4
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then the price adjustment is positive even when the marginal bene￿t from treatment is
constant; c) we further show that the optimal price is lower when lump-sum transfers are
not allowed, compared to when they are allowed; moreover, the price adjustment when
lump-sum transfers are allowed is also higher than the price adjustment when lump-sum
transfers are not allowed if the cost function is not too convex; otherwise the comparison
is indeterminate; d) ￿nally we show that higher inequality aversion of the purchaser is
associated with an increase in the price for the high-cost providers and a reduction in the
price of the low-cost providers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the main assumptions of
the model and derives the optimal pricing policy. Section 3 compares the optimal price
adjustment when lump-sum transfers are allowed and when they are not. Section 4 extends
the analysis by assuming that the purchaser is averse to inequality. Section 5 extends the
basic model with quality. Section 6 presents the concluding remarks.
2 The Model
2.1 Provider
De￿ne q as the number of patients treated by each provider. The provider receives from
the purchaser a price p for each patient treated. We interpret p as the reimbursement per
1.0 DRG equal, for example, to roughly US$ 4000 under the Medicare Programme during
the mid-1990s.
We assume that providers di⁄er in costs. The cost function of provider ￿ is C (￿;q).
We assume Cq > 0 and Cqq > 0: cost is increasing in quantity at an increasing rate.3
We also assume that C￿ > 0 and Cq￿ > 0: hospitals with higher ￿ have higher cost and
higher marginal cost of treatment. We assume that ￿ is observable to the purchaser.
3As the activity volume approaches the provider￿ s capacity it is plausible to assume that the marginal
cost increases due to congestion costs arising on limited capacity. For example, treating patients in con-
gested conditions is more demanding and stressful as more e⁄ort by the doctor is required to treat an extra
patient.
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Price adjustment in the hospital sectorIn England ￿ can be interpreted as unavoidable cost di⁄erences between providers, for
example accounting for the fact that land, building and sta⁄ costs are considerably higher
in some areas rather than others (for example London area versus the Midlands area).
Hospitals are taken to be pro￿t-maximisers (or surplus maximisers). The utility of
the provider U is given by U (￿;q) = pq ￿ C (￿;q). This assumption may seem unrealistic
for hospitals operating in a publicly-funded health care system, since public hospitals
have constraints on the distribution of pro￿ts. However, they may add to their reserves
the ￿nancial surplus obtained. Alternatively, managers may spend the surplus to pursue
other objectives such as increasing physician sta⁄, expanding the range of services, or even
increasing managerial perks (see Dranove and White, 1994; De Fraja, 2000; Chalkley and
Malcomson, 1998a and 1998b; Rickman and McGuire, 1999). For example Foundation
Trusts in England, despite being public providers, are the residual claimants of their
surpluses and, therefore, are considered to be pro￿t maximizers (Department of Health,
2002b). Each provider ￿ maximises its utility U by optimally choosing quantity q such
that the following First Order Condition (FOC) is satis￿ed:
p = Cq(￿;q) (1)
That is, the optimal quantity chosen is such that the price equals the marginal cost of
treatment. The Second Order Condition (SOC) is @2U (￿;q)=@q2 = ￿Cqq < 0, which is




















































CHE Research Paper 41which will be useful below. If qp￿ < 0 then providers with higher costs respond less to an
increase in price than providers with lower costs. qpp indicates whether the responsiveness
of quantity with respect to price increases or decreases for higher levels of price. In
general, the sign of these expressions depends on the speci￿c functional form of total
cost. Suppose that the cost function is the power function C(￿;q) = ￿q￿=￿ with ￿ > 1
(note that for ￿ = 2 we obtain the commonly used quadratic cost function ￿q2=2), then
qp￿ = ￿ 1
￿2(￿￿1)2q￿￿2 < 0 and providers with higher costs respond less to a marginal increase
in price, and qpp = ￿
￿￿2
￿2(￿￿1)2q2￿￿3, which is negative for ￿ > 2: the responsiveness of
activity to price decreases with price.
2.2 Purchaser
De￿ne Ws as the utility of the purchaser of health services.4 The purchaser buys medical
care from the provider at a price p. We assume that the purchaser￿ s utility is a weighted
sum of patients￿utility (or consumers￿surplus) and providers￿utility net of the transfer
to the provider (weighted by the opportunity cost of public funds). More precisely, de￿ne
B (q) as patients￿bene￿t, with Bq > 0, Bqq ￿ 0: bene￿t is increasing in quantity at a
(weakly) decreasing rate; ￿ 2 [0;1] as the weight attached to the provider; and ￿ > 0 as the
shadow cost of public funds, i.e. for each $1 levied to subsidize health care expenditure,
distortionary taxation generates $(1 + ￿) disutility for the taxpayers. The purchaser￿ s
utility is then Ws = B (q) + ￿U (￿;q) ￿ (1 + ￿)pq, which after substitution of U gives
Ws = B (q) ￿ (1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)pq ￿ ￿C (￿;q): (5)
This speci￿cation clusters three polar cases of welfare functions. 1) The ￿rst accrues to
the scenario where public funds are not costly (￿ = 0) and the purchaser attaches zero
weight to the provider￿ s utility (￿ = 0). In this case the welfare function coincides with net
consumer surplus: W = B (q)￿pq. 2) For a purchaser attaching equal weight to consumer
and provider surplus (￿ = 1), in the absence of distortionary e⁄ects from raising public
4Superscript s will be used throughout the paper to denote the scenario with no lump-sum transfers.
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Price adjustment in the hospital sectorfunds (￿ = 0), we obtain a utilitarian welfare function: W = B (q) ￿ C (￿;q). 3) Finally,
if raising public funds is costly (￿ > 0) and ￿ = 1, then W = B (q) ￿ C (￿;q) ￿ ￿pq.
For each provider ￿ the regulator sets the price p(￿). The optimal price ps to be paid
to provider ￿ is then characterized by the following FOC (@W=@p(ps) = 0):
Bqqp = [(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿](q + qpp) + ￿Cqqp (6)
Dividing by qp and rearranging, we obtain:











p = qp(p=q) > 0 is the elasticity of quantity with respect to price. At the optimum,
the marginal bene￿t from treatment for the patients is equal to the marginal cost. The
marginal cost includes two components: i) the cost associated with the purchaser payment
to the hospital, weighted by the shadow cost of public funds; ii) the treatment costs
multiplied by the weight attached to the provider￿ s utility. Notice how a higher provider￿ s
elasticity of quantity to price implies a lower marginal cost. For the special cases de￿ned
above, we obtain that if the purchaser disregards provider￿ s utility and health expenditure
is funded out of non-distortionary taxation (￿ = 0;￿ = 0) the optimal price is such that the
marginal bene￿t of treatment equals the marginal cost of the transfer from the purchaser







. With an utilitarian purchaser (￿ = 1) results are twofold:
if raising public funds is not costly (￿ = 0) the optimal price is set such that the marginal
bene￿t is equal to the marginal cost of treatment, Bq = Cq. Otherwise, if public funds
are costly the optimal price is such that the marginal bene￿t from treatment equals the
marginal cost of the transfer from the purchaser to the provider plus the marginal cost







+ Cq. Note that the optimal price is higher under
the former, as, for the same bene￿ts, social costs are lower.
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which establishes that the optimal price is set below the marginal bene￿t. The ￿rst term
is the marginal bene￿t from treatment discounted for the opportunity cost of public funds.
Since leaving a rent to the provider is costly, the second term is negative and implies a
lower price. Note that a higher responsiveness of activity (qp) to price implies a higher
optimal price.
The Second Order Condition is @2W=@p2 < 0 and is always satis￿ed (see Appendix
A). By the implicit function theorem we obtain dps=d￿ = ￿@2W
@p@￿=@2W
@p2 . Therefore the sign
of dps=d￿ depends on the sign of @2W




= Bqqqpq￿ ￿ (1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)q￿ +
(1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)q
qp
qp￿ (9)
There are three main terms. The ￿rst term is positive. Since high-cost providers provide
lower activity, the marginal bene￿t from an increase in activity is higher and therefore
the price should be higher (treatment e⁄ect). The second term is also positive. Again,
since high-cost providers provide lower activity, the rent for high-cost providers, and the
associated cost, is lower. Therefore the price should be higher (rent e⁄ect). The third term
is negative whenever high-cost providers respond less to an increase in price, i.e. when
qp￿ < 0, which is the case for many well-behaved cost functions. Since an increase in price
is less e⁄ective in boosting activity for high-cost providers, then the optimal price should
be lower (responsiveness e⁄ect). Therefore, the price for high-cost providers is higher than
for low-cost providers only if the ￿rst two e⁄ects dominate the third.









￿BqqCq￿ + (1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)f(Cq￿ ￿ qCqq￿)Cqq + qCq￿Cqqqg
￿Bqq + (1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)qCqqq + (2 ￿ ￿ + 2￿)Cqq
(10)
The denominator of dps=d￿ is positive when the SOC of the purchaser￿ s problem is satis￿ed
9
Price adjustment in the hospital sector(i.e. Wpp < 0). The sign of dps=d￿ is determined by the sign of the numerator which is in
general indeterminate and will di⁄er according to the functional form of the cost function.
Proposition 1 provides a condition that guarantees that the price is higher for providers
with higher costs.
Proposition 1 Suppose that: (a) costs behave according to the power function: C(￿;q) =
￿q￿=￿, with ￿ > 1; and (b) the marginal bene￿t from treatment is decreasing (Bqq < 0);











￿Bqq + ￿(￿ ￿ 1)q￿￿2 (￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿ + ￿￿)
< Cq￿: (11)
Hospitals with higher costs receive a higher price. Moreover, the price increase (price
adjustment) for providers with higher costs is smaller than the additional marginal cost.
Proof. >From C(￿;q) = ￿q￿=￿ with ￿ > 1, we obtain Cq = ￿q￿￿1 > 0, Cqq =
￿(￿ ￿ 1)q￿￿2 > 0, Cq￿ = q￿￿1 > 0, Cqqq = ￿(￿ ￿ 1)(￿ ￿ 2)q￿￿3, Cqq￿ = (￿ ￿ 1)q￿￿2. By
substitution we obtain Cq￿￿qCqq￿+q
Cq￿Cqqq
Cqq = q￿￿1￿q (￿ ￿ 1)q￿￿2+q
q￿￿1￿(￿￿1)(￿￿2)q￿￿3
￿(￿￿1)q￿￿2 =
0. Substituting in (10) for Cqq = ￿(￿ ￿ 1)q￿￿2, Cqqq = ￿(￿ ￿ 1)(￿ ￿ 2)q￿￿3 we obtain
[(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿]qCqqq + (2 ￿ ￿ + 2￿)Cqq = ￿(￿ ￿ 1)q￿￿2 [￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿ + ￿￿] > 0.
Therefore, for a broad class of cost functions with decreasing returns to scale, like the
power function, we have that the providers with higher costs ￿ are paid higher prices when
the marginal bene￿t from treatment is decreasing (Bqq < 0). Intuitively, if the marginal
bene￿t is decreasing with quantity, then the regulator is willing to pay a higher price to the
high-cost provider in order to induce the treatment of patients that, compared to patients
receiving care in the low-cost provider, bene￿t more from treatment, i.e. the treatment
e⁄ect is stronger for high-cost providers. Notice that for this speci￿cation the expression
in the curly brackets of Eq.(10) is zero and the rent e⁄ect is, perhaps surprisingly, exactly
o⁄set by the responsiveness e⁄ect.
As a corollary, note that if the marginal bene￿t from treatment is instead constant
(Bqq = 0), it is optimal for the purchaser to set the same price for each provider regardless
10
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lower activity by a high-cost provider no longer has an impact on the marginal bene￿t from
treatment and therefore there is no incentive to pay providers di⁄erently. This might be
the case for interventions, such as diagnostic procedures, where the bene￿t of intervention
is not known in advance.
A related issue is whether the price adjustment designed by the purchaser should be
proportional to the increase in the marginal cost faced by high-cost providers. Proposi-
tion 1 establishes that such adjustment is smaller than the marginal cost. Even though,
intuitively one would expect that the price adjustment paid to high-cost providers should
cover the cost di⁄erence between providers, given that the marginal bene￿t is decreasing,
the price adjustment is only partial. As a limit case, note that if ￿ ! 1 (constant marginal
cost), then the price adjustment is instead proportional to the increase in the marginal
cost faced by high-cost providers, as lim￿!1dps=d￿ = Cq￿.
Proposition 2 shows the price adjustment for a di⁄erent cost function.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the cost function of the provider is exponential: C(￿;q) =









￿BqqCq￿ + (1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)￿￿3e2￿q
￿Bqq + (1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)qCqqq + (2 ￿ ￿ + 2￿)Cqq
> 0 (12)
Proof. Suppose that C(￿;q) = ￿e￿q with ￿ > 0, then, Cq = ￿￿e￿q, Cqq = ￿￿2e￿q,
Cq￿ = ￿e￿q > 0, Cqqq = ￿￿3e￿q > 0, Cqq￿ = ￿2e￿q. By substitution we obtain that
￿




Cqq = ￿￿3e2￿q > 0. Since Bqq < 0 and Cq￿ > 0 the numerator is
positive. The denominator is also positive implying dp=d￿ > 0.
When the cost function is exponential, it is still the case that hospitals with a higher
cost receive a higher price. Notice that this result holds even if the marginal bene￿t from
treatment is constant (Bqq = 0). This result is in contrast with the previous example,
when the cost follows the power function, in which case we have shown that dps=d￿ = 0
for Bqq = 0:
Finally we investigate how activity varies across providers in equilibrium. Since qs =
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where @q=@￿ < 0 while @q=@ps > 0 and @ps=@￿ > 0. More extensively, after substitution




￿(1 + ￿)Cq￿ ￿ (1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)qCqq￿
￿Bqq + (1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)qCqqq + (2 ￿ ￿ + 2￿)Cqq
(13)
The denominator is positive when the SOC of the purchaser￿ s problem is satis￿ed. The ￿rst
term in the numerator is negative. The second term is also negative whenever Cqq￿ > 0,
i.e. whenever the cost function is more concave for providers with higher costs. Suppose
that the cost function is multiplicative separable C(￿;q) = ￿ e C(q), with e Cq > 0, e Cqq > 0.
Then Cqq￿ = e Cqq > 0 and hospitals with higher costs provide less activity in equilibrium.
This condition is clearly satis￿ed for the two cost functions of propositions 1 and 2, when
the cost function is respectively the power function or the exponential function (as they
are both multiplicatively separable in ￿). Providers with higher costs provide a lower
quantity.
Finally, high-cost providers may have a higher or lower pro￿t in equilibrium, since the
sign of @U=@￿ = q@p=@￿ ￿ C￿ is ambiguous.5 Indeed, @U=@￿ depends on the sign and
magnitude of @p=@￿, and of the cost and bene￿t functions. For the special case when
the price does not vary across providers, providers with higher costs have lower pro￿t. If
instead @p=@￿ > 0, and for the case of the power cost function, high-cost providers have
higher pro￿ts only when the bene￿t function is su¢ ciently concave (proof omitted).
In summary, when lump-sum transfers cannot be used as regulatory instruments,
providers are allowed economic rents. Since these rents are costly then the regulator
faces a trade-o⁄ between e¢ ciency and rent extraction and therefore a ￿xed price policy
will result in a second-best allocation. The next section compares the solution with a
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We de￿ne as First Best a scenario where the purchaser can use prices as well as lump-sum
transfers to remunerate the provider. We also assume that, like prices, lump-sum transfers
can di⁄er across providers. De￿ne T (￿) as the lump-sum transfer received by provider ￿
in conjunction with the price p(￿) for each patient treated. The utility of the provider is
now given by Uf (￿;q) = pq + T ￿ C (￿;q). The optimal quantity chosen by the provider
is the one that satis￿es: p = Cq(￿;q), which for a given price coincides with the solution
found in section 2.1.
As in the previous section the purchaser problem is to maximise Wf = B (q) +
￿Uf (￿;q) ￿ (1 + ￿)(pq + T) subject to Uf = pq + T ￿ C(￿;q) ￿ 0.6 From the de￿n-
ition of Uf we can write pq = Uf + C(￿;q), which substituted into Wf, gives Wf =
B (q) ￿ (1 + ￿)C(￿;q) ￿ (1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)Uf. Since public funds are costly (￿ > 0), and the
weight attached to the utility of the provider is weakly less than one, ￿ ￿ 1, leaving a
rent to the provider is costly from the purchaser￿ s perspective (as @Wf=@Uf < 0). The
optimal transfer will be then set at the minimum needed to ensure that the participation
constraint of the provider is satis￿ed, so that Uf = 0 (and T = C (￿;q) ￿ pq).
The purchaser objective function is given by:
max
p Wf = B (q(p)) ￿ (1 + ￿)C (￿;q(p)) (14)
Maximizing Wf with respect to p the optimal price, denoted as pf, is then characterized
by the following FOC:
Bqqp = (1 + ￿)Cqqp (15)
The price is set such that the marginal bene￿t from treatment is equal to its marginal
cost (Bq = (1 + ￿)Cq).7 Using the FOC for the optimal quantity of the provider, p = Cq,
we also establish from the FOC of the purchaser that: pf = Bq=(1 + ￿), i.e. the price is
6Superscript f will be used to denote the ￿rst-best scenario.




p ￿ (1 + ￿)Cqqq
2
p + qpp (Bq ￿ (1 + ￿)Cq) < 0.
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Price adjustment in the hospital sectorequal to the marginal bene￿t discounted for the opportunity cost of public funds.
Proposition 3 compares the optimal price when lump-sum transfers are allowed and
when they are not.
Proposition 3 When lump-sum transfers are allowed the optimal price paid to a provider
of type ￿ is larger than the optimal price when no lump-sum transfers are allowed, i.e.
pf > ps.
Proof. When no lump-sum transfers are allowed the optimal price is characterized
by the ￿rst order condition: Bqqp = [(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿](q + qpp) + ￿Cqqp. Given that p =
Cq, by substitution and rearranging, we obtain Bqqp = (1 + ￿)Cqqp + (1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)q. For
(1 + ￿ ￿ ￿) > 0 the price solving this condition is necessarily lower than the one solving
Bqqp = (1 + ￿)Cqqp.
Intuitively, when lump-sum transfers are not allowed, the provider obtains a positive
rent. In contrast when they are allowed the rent is zero. To reduce such rents it is optimal
for the purchaser to set a lower price. Since quantity is monotonically increasing in price,
we can also establish that the quantity of care provided will be lower when lump-sum











￿Bqq + (1 + ￿)Cqq
> 0 (16)
If the marginal bene￿t is decreasing, providers with higher ￿ are paid higher tari⁄s. How-
ever, the price increase (or tari⁄ adjustment) for providers with higher costs is smaller
than the additional marginal cost, i.e. dpf=d￿ < Cq￿. Again, if the marginal bene￿t is







= [Bqq ￿ (1 + ￿)Cqq]qpq￿ ￿ (1 + ￿)Cq￿qp
























CHE Research Paper 41constant then the optimal price will be equal across all providers, i.e. dpf=d￿ = 0. This
result is in contrast with proposition 2, where we showed that providers that face a higher
cost receive a higher price even when the marginal bene￿t is constant.
We have already established that the optimal price chosen by the purchaser is lower
when lump-sum transfers are not allowed. We want now to establish whether the adjust-
ment is also smaller, ie whether dpf=d￿ > dps=d￿.












b + (2 ￿ ￿ + 2￿)￿
> 0 (17)
Note that the denominator of dps=d￿ is larger while the numerator is smaller compared to
dpf=d￿ and therefore we conclude that the price adjustment is also smaller when lump-sum
transfers are not allowed, i.e dpf=d￿ > dps=d￿.
Suppose now that the cost function is the more general C(￿;q) = ￿q￿=￿ with ￿ > 1







b + ￿(￿ ￿ 1)(1 + ￿)(qf)






b + ￿(￿ ￿ 1)[￿ (1 + ￿) + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)](qs)
￿￿2 > 0 (19)
Given that qf > qs the numerator of dpf=d￿ is larger than the numerator of dps=d￿. Given
that ￿ (1 + ￿) + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) > (1 + ￿), for ￿ > 1, then also the denominator of dpf=d￿ is
smaller when 1 < ￿ ￿ 2, and dpf=d￿ > dps=d￿. Otherwise the comparison is ambiguous
when ￿ > 2. In summary, the price adjustment is smaller when no lump-sum transfers
are allowed when the cost function is not too convex, i.e 1 < ￿ ￿ 2. The comparison is
ambiguous when ￿ > 2.
Similarly, suppose that the cost function is exponential: C(￿;q) = ￿e￿q with ￿ > 0.
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+ [(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿]￿￿3e2￿qs
b + (1 + ￿)￿￿2e￿qs + ￿e￿qs￿2 (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿)(1 + ￿qs)
> 0: (21)
Comparing the numerators of both expressions given that qf > qs, the comparison is
indeterminate. The comparison of the denominators is also indeterminate. Therefore the
relation between dpf=d￿ and dps=d￿ is ambiguous. Note that if the marginal bene￿t is
constant (i.e. Bqq = 0) then dps=d￿ > dpf=d￿ = 0: the price adjustment is smaller when
lump-sum transfers are not allowed.
The analysis above establishes that when lump-sum transfers are allowed, the price
is higher for hospitals with higher costs. How does the optimal lump-sum transfer dif-




￿ pf (￿)q(￿;pf(￿)) < 0.
Di⁄erentiating T with respect to the cost parameter ￿, using p = Cq, we ￿nd:
dT
d￿




￿Bqq + (1 + ￿)Cqq
(22)
Given that dpf=d￿ > 0 the sign of dT=d￿ is ambiguous and will depend on the cost and
bene￿t functions. If the marginal bene￿t is constant then dT=d￿ > 0: If the marginal
bene￿t is decreasing, the price adjustment increases with the degree concavity of the
bene￿t function. Since higher concavity implies that a marginal increase in activity from
a high-cost provider leads to a large increase in bene￿t, it is more worthwhile to increase
prices. However, a higher price implies more rent which will be extracted through a higher
lump-sum transfer (in absolute values). Note that these results mirror the ￿ndings of the
previous discussion on @U=@￿.




= q￿ (￿ ￿ 1)
Bqq + (1 + ￿)￿q￿￿2
￿Bqq￿ + (1 + ￿)￿￿ (￿ ￿ 1)q￿￿2 ? 0 (23)
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with higher costs have a lower lump-sum transfer only when the bene￿t function is su¢ -
ciently concave (dT=d￿ < 0), otherwise the e⁄ect is positive (dT=d￿ > 0). Note that since
the lump-sum transfer is negative (T (￿) < 0), if dT=d￿ < 0 then providers with higher
costs have to pay to the purchaser a larger transfer than the providers with lower costs.
Finally, we investigate how activity varies across providers in equilibrium. Since qf =














￿Bqq + (1 + ￿)Cqq
< 0 (24)
and hospitals with higher costs provide a lower quantity.
4 Extension with inequality aversion
Consider now that the purchaser maximizes a welfare function which is parameterized by
a degree of social aversion to inequality. This could arise because of a desire to equalise
geographical access to hospital services.9 The bene￿t of the purchaser when patients






1￿￿ ￿ 6= 1
ln(B (q)) ￿ = 1
(25)
where ￿ is an index of social aversion to inequality in the provision of quantity. Higher ￿
implies more aversion to inequality. In the limit, an in￿nite degree of aversion to inequality
corresponds to the Rawlsian egalitarian social preferences (i.e. the maximization of the
least-favoured). For ￿ = 0 we obtain the utilitarian welfare function.
To keep the analysis simple, we assume that there are two types of providers such that
9Note that, implicitly, we are assuming that there is no mobility of patients across providers and that,
being local monopolists, health care is always commissioned to all providers irrespectively of their e¢ ciency
level.
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Price adjustment in the hospital sector￿i 2 f￿1;￿2g. The proportion of type 1 is ! and the proportion of type 2 is (1 ￿ !); with
! 2 (0;1). Without loss of generality we assume that ￿2 > ￿1: provider 2 faces higher
exogenous costs. The marginal welfare gain from an increase in the bene￿t for patients in
hospital i is given by WB = B￿￿ and WB￿ = ￿ln(B)=B￿.
We assume that the purchaser has a global budget K, which can be used to ￿nance
the two types of provider. As in section 2, we assume that lump-sum transfers are not












s:t: !p1q1 (￿1;p1) + (1 ￿ !)p2q2 (￿2;p2) ￿ K (27)









￿ ￿[!p1q1 + (1 ￿ !)p2q2 ￿ K] (28)





￿￿ Bq1qp1 ￿ !￿(q1 + p1qp1) = 0 (29)
@L
@p2
= (1 ￿ !)B (q2)
￿￿ Bq2qp2 ￿ (1 ￿ !)￿(q2 + p2qp2) = 0
@L
@￿
= ￿!p1q1 ￿ (1 ￿ !)p2q2 + K = 0
In analogy to the results obtained in section 2, the price for the high-cost provider is higher
than the price for the low-cost provider, i.e. p2 > p1.10 Rearranging @L=@pi = 0, and
dividing by qpi, we obtain:
B (qi)







10The proof for this result is omitted for brevity but available from the authors.
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CHE Research Paper 41The marginal bene￿t from treatment is equal to the marginal cost in terms of the oppor-
tunity cost associated with the budget constraint. The second term takes into account the
e⁄ect of price on the rents.









The ￿rst term is the marginal bene￿t from treatment discounted for the opportunity cost





￿(1 ￿ !)(q1 + p1qp1)(q2 + p2qp2)






￿! (q2 + p2qp2)(p1qp1 + q1)
2 ￿(ln(B2) ￿ ln(B1))
J
> 0 (33)
where J is a positive expression (see Appendix C). Given that the logarithm function is
monotonic and increasing in its argument it follows that ln(B1) > ln(B2) and therefore,
given that ! 2 (0;1) and ￿2 > ￿1, then dp1=d￿ < 0 while dp2=d￿ > 0. When inequality
aversion is higher, the price for the high-cost provider is higher, while the price of the
low-cost provider is lower. Since p2 > p1, this also implies that d(p2 ￿ p1)=d￿ > 0: the
price di⁄erential between the high-cost provider and the low-cost provider increases with
the degree of inequality aversion.
The di⁄erence between the bene￿ts of the patients treated within the two types of
hospital become more relevant for the purchaser when the inequality aversion increases.
Since provider 2 has a lower health bene￿t, the price paid to provider 2 is increased and
the one paid to provider 1 is decreased so that di⁄erences in health outcomes between the
two providers are reduced.
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In this section we extend the model by introducing quality, and we show that the results
using this more general speci￿cation are similar to the ones obtained above. We follow the
approach suggested by Ma (1994) and Chalkley and Malcomson (1998b). De￿ne m as the
quality generated by the provider. The cost function of the provider is C(￿;q;m)+’(q;m).
C includes the monetary cost, which increases with quality and activity: C(￿;q;m), with
Cq > 0 and Cm > 0. ’ is the non-monetary cost, or disutility, which increases with
activity and quality: ’(q;m), with ’q > 0 and ’m > 0.
We also assume that the demand for treatment depends positively on quality so that
q = q(m) with qm > 0 and qm ￿ 0. This assumption implies q = q(m) , m = m(q); mq >
0. Therefore by contracting activity the purchaser can implicitly contract the level of qual-
ity. The bene￿t function of the patients is B = B(q;m) with Bq > 0 and Bm > 0. Since






@q > 0. The provider￿ s utility is given by the surplus: U = py￿C(q;m(q))￿’(q;m(q)).
The purchaser￿ s utility is B (q;m(q)) ￿ (1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)pq ￿ ￿ [C (￿;q;m(q)) + ’(q;m(q))].
Since the bene￿t function is increasing and concave in quantity while the cost function
(the sum of the monetary and non-monetary cost) is increasing and convex in quantity,
the same qualitative results of sections 2-4 are obtained.
6 Conclusions
We have investigated the optimal pricing system when hospitals di⁄er in costs, and such
di⁄erences are observable to the purchaser of health services. Costs might vary because
of unavoidable di⁄erences in factor prices faced by hospitals in di⁄erent locations. These
di⁄erences are taken into account by the purchasers (regulators or governments) in the
design of the optimal price. For example the Department of Health in England adjusts
the price to re￿ ect, at least to some extent, di⁄erences in costs. We have derived the
optimal properties of such adjustments, when purchasers can use only prices to reimburse
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the only instrument to pay for healthcare services, then providers might hold some rents.
Since rents are costly from the purchaser (and society￿ s) perspective, the design of the
optimal price needs to take into account also the potential e⁄ect of variations in prices on
such rents.
We have shown that in a constrained (and realistic) institutional setting, where price is
the only instrument of the purchaser (which we term the second-best scenario), providers
with higher costs will be remunerated with higher tari⁄s if the cost function is the power
function or the exponential function. This result is qualitatively similar to what we might
obtain in a ￿rst-best setting where lump-sum transfers are allowed and providers never
hold a rent. However, we have shown that the price in the second best is typically lower
than in the ￿rst best: since a higher price implies a higher rent, the purchaser optimally
sets a lower price.
We have also shown that the positive price adjustment for hospitals with higher costs
is typically smaller than the additional marginal cost, whenever the marginal bene￿t from
treatment is decreasing. While in the ￿rst best the presence of constant marginal bene￿t
implies a constant price across providers, in the second best the same result holds if the cost
function is the power function. If the cost function is exponential, the price adjustment
might be positive in the second best even when the marginal bene￿t is constant.
Finally, we have shown that higher inequality aversion will imply an increase in the
price for the high-cost providers and a reduction in the price of the low-cost providers.
It also implies that the di⁄erence in the price of the high-cost provider and the price of
the low-cost provider increases with inequality aversion. In other words, when inequality
aversion matters, purchasers of health services are more willing to pay a higher price for
the high-cost provider at the cost of reducing the price for the low-cost one.
Our conclusions remain qualitatively unchanged when the purchaser is concerned not
only about quantity but also about quality.
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Price adjustment in the hospital sectorA Second Order Condition
The SOC is given by:
Wpp :=
@2W
@p2 = (Bqq ￿ ￿Cqq)q2
p + (Bq ￿ ￿Cq)qpp ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿](2qp + pqpp) < 0: (34)




2 ￿ (Bq ￿ ￿Cq)
Cqqq
(Cqq)










B E⁄ect of ￿ on price: dps=d￿
By the implicit function theorem, @2W
@p@￿d￿ + @2W










= (Bqq ￿ ￿Cqq)qpq￿ + fBq ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿]p ￿ ￿Cqgqp￿ ￿ ￿Cq￿qp ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿]q￿
Notice that: i) ￿￿Cqqqpq￿ ￿ ￿Cq￿qp = 0; ii) from the FOC of the purchaser (6), we have
that Bq￿(1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)Cq￿￿Cq =
(1+￿￿￿)q
qp ; and Eq.(37) is obtained. Moreover, substituting





(1 + ￿ ￿ ￿)
Cqq
￿









@p2 , the result is obtained.
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￿￿ Bq1qp1 ￿ !￿(q1 + p1qp1) = 0
@L
@p2
= (1 ￿ !)B (q2)
￿￿ Bq2qp2 ￿ (1 ￿ !)￿(q2 + p2qp2) = 0
@L
@￿
= ￿!p1q1 ￿ (1 ￿ !)p2q2 + K = 0
Let F1 ￿ @L
@p1; F2 ￿ @L
@p2; and F3 ￿ @L
































































































































































￿ !￿(2qp1 + p1qp1p1) < 0
@F2
@p2






￿ ￿(1 ￿ !)(2qp2 + p2qp2p2) < 0
@F1
@￿
= ￿! (q1 + p1qp1) < 0;
@F2
@￿
= ￿(1 ￿ !)(q2 + p2qp2) < 0
@F3
@p1
= ￿! (p1qp1 + q1) < 0;
@F3
@p2


































































A1 = ￿(1 ￿ !)(q1 + p1qp1)(q2 + p2qp2)












































= ￿! (q2 + p2qp2)(p1qp1 + q1)
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￿! (q2 + p2qp2)(p1qp1 + q1)
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